Transcript of Bush/Cheney Testimony Before 9/11
Commission
By Bernard Weiner
The Crisis Papers
Chairman
Kean: The Commission will come to order. Welcome, Mr. President and Mr.
Vice President. Although, per our agreement, you are not being placed under
oath, we expect that your testimony will consist only of the truth. The
Commission and the American people deserve no less, and we trust you are in full
agreement with this expectation.
Cheney:
Yes, of course.
Bush:
Sure, OK.
Kean:
I have a few preliminary questions. First, Mr. President, please tell us what
pre-9/11 warnings you were receiving in the Summer of 2001 from various
intelligence agencies and from other nations' leaders about a possible coming Al
Qaida attack.
Bush:
It was all historical. You know, old stuff, very general, about Osama's desire
to hurt the United States. They hate us, you know, hate our freedoms. Nothing
specific.
Kean:
Did you receive warnings about the possibility of airplanes being hijacked and
used as weapons?
Bush:
Nobody would have ever thought of that. For example, there was the Genoa summit
where—
Cheney:
To complete that thought. There had been some information in the past,
historical reports, about how Al Qaida might want to hijack an airplane and
exchange the hostages for the release of the blind Muslim leader. But, of
course, nothing about planes used as weapons.
Kean:
But the President just mentioned the Genoa Summit meeting of world leaders,
where there was intelligence that terrorists might want to fly a plane into the
hotel where the heads of state were staying. I presume that is why President
Bush chose to stay on a naval vessel offshore. Is that what you were referring
to, Mr. President?
Cheney:
I think the President was referring to the fact that the world leaders,
assembled for an economic summit, were also going to be talking about how to
combat terrorism.
Kean:
Excuse me, Mr. Vice President, but I was addressing that question to the
President.
Bush:
The Vice President has explained my position.
Kean:
Very well. Let's move on to what, on the surface, appears to be inexplicable
behavior at the Florida schoolhouse on the morning of 9/11. Mr. President, you
were in the schoolroom listening to children read, your Chief of Staff Andrew
Card walked in and told you that the second tower had been struck by another
jet; America clearly was under attack from some nation or band of terrorists,
yet you did not quickly leave, the Secret Service did not whisk you away to
safety, your staff did not request that you depart to assume command as
Commander in Chief. In short, your behavior was so casual as to leave one
puzzled. Could you explain, please?
Bush:
It was a very emotional, confusing time, so I'm not sure I can remember all the
details of that morning. As to why I continued to sit there, I knew that the
Vice President was on top of things in Washington
and—
Cheney:
We conferred on the phone, coordinating the approach the government should be
taking. I took the President's commands and implemented them while he made his
way back to the capital.
Chaos & Confusion
Kean:
Let's ignore for a moment the whole phone-communication discussion -- that is,
how and when you two conferred when the President was sitting in the classroom
for 20+ minutes; the key question is why he didn't exit the classroom
immediately, both for safety's sake in case terrorists were out to get him as
well, and in terms of assuming command and control of the government's response.
How can that be explained?
Cheney:
If I may, Mr. Chairman. It was a chaotic time that morning. While the government
responses were being prepared, and information gathered -- by Dick Clarke,
myself, and so on -- it was all so confusing, there was no precedent for how to
behave, etc.
Bush:
Very confusing. Very historical.
Kean:
Very well. One more question from me and then we'll open it up to questions from
the Commissioners. Would you explain, please, Mr. President, why during the
summer of 2001, when the threat reports were spiking, you left Washington, D.C.,
for a month's vacation in Texas, and therefore did not confer directly with CIA
Director Tenet about those increasing reports; and why Attorney General
Ashcroft, having received an FBI "threat assessment," stopped flying on
commercial aircraft? The implication certainly is that your Administration had
received reliable reports that aircraft might be hijacked and used as weapons
aimed at buildings in Washington and New York City. Certainly nobody would fault
you for protecting yourselves and the ongoing governmental institutions, but
what the victims' families have requested me to ask you is this: If you took
steps to protect yourselves from harm, why, when you realized a massive attack
was in the works, why did you do little or nothing to help protect ordinary
American citizens on commercial aircraft and in those skyscrapers and government
buildings?
Bush:
It was all historical information. No specifics. If we'd had specific
information, we would have moved earth and the...earth and the...you know what I
mean, to stop those Islam fanatics.
Cheney:
None of the warnings ever provided enough to act on. Non-actionable
intelligence. It was all vague. And historical.
Why No Action Taken?
Kean:
Commissioner Ben Veniste?
Ben
Veniste: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, let me read you key
descriptions of the warnings in the Presidential Daily Briefing of 6 August
2001, and then you tell me whether you feel those words should have provoked
some actionable moves on your part to protect the American people.
Bush:
Nothing specific, not enough to go on. I would have moved heaven and...heaven
and...you know what I mean, to protect the American people.
Ben
Veniste: Yes. Let's look at that intelligence summary: The title of
that PDB memo is "Bin Laden Determined To Attack In the United States" -- not,
as Ari Fleischer told the press originally, "Bin Laden Determined to Attack the
United States." In the PDB is a reference to the fact that al Qaeda was
currently maintaining a "support structure" in the United States. And it
cited information obtained in May 2001 suggesting "that a group of bin Laden
supporters was in the U.S. planning attacks with explosives." It specifically
refers to "patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with
preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks," and mentions that
terrorist suspects were observed doing "recent surveillance of federal buildings
in New York." Do those quotes refresh your recollection about the dire warnings
that something extraordinary was about to happen?
Bush:
There were no flight numbers, no date, all very vague. Nobody could have
imagined that planes—
Cheney:
I think we've answered your question, Mr. Ben Veniste. Let us move on to another
topic.
Ben
Veniste: I don't recall my asking you a question, sir. Now, Mr.
President, following up on your answer, let me ask you this: Does it seem
reasonable that a secretive terrorist organization would provide you with the
actual flight numbers and date for their attack? The key question remains: With
all the fairly specific warnings that you were made privy to, why you did not
take actions that perhaps would have helped protect American citizens, as you
swore to do when you took your oath of office as President?
Cheney:
With all due respect, Mr. Ben Veniste, we have made time in our busy schedules
to be here with you today, but going over and over the same point seems
counter-productive. Might we move on, please?
Ben
Veniste: May I remind the witness once again that the rules of this
hearing are set by the Commission, not by the Vice President of the United
States. Please be so good as to answer the question, Mr. President.
Bush:
It's all so complicated. You wouldn't believe the amount of paper work and
issues a President has to deal with. That was more than three years ago, and I
can't remember all the details. The Vice President has a better handle on those
facts, and I would prefer that he speak on my behalf.
Kean:
The witness will answer the question posed to him.
Cheney:
This is not a court of law, Mr. Chairman. We appear here voluntarily to assist
the Commission in its duties of trying to assess where our intelligence and
law-enforcement agencies might have gone wrong, might have missed connecting the
dots and so on. The FBI and the CIA were deficient—
Kean:
The witness will answer the question posed to him. Mr. President, please
proceed.
Cheney: There are important questions of separation of powers here, Mr. Chairman. The Executive cannot be compelled by the Legislative branch to answer questions that might compromise national security and the right of the President to assert Executive Privilege.
Kean:
Mr. Vice President, please listen to me carefully. The question was not posed to
you, but to the President. If you persist in interrupting, you will be asked to
leave the room, and we will call you separately to testify later. Finally, this
is not a legislative body; the President and Congress have established this
independent Commission. You both have agreed to tell us the truth of what you
know. Now, Mr. President, the Commissioners are waiting to hear your response to
the question posed by Commissioner Ben Veniste.
Cheney:
Mr. Chairman, please listen to me equally as carefully. The President and I
didn't agree to come here today to be badgered by the Commission, but rather to
try to assist you in putting together an understanding of how and why our
intelligence services might have fallen down on the job. If you persist in going
over old grounds and into national security matters that are outside your
purview, we will have no other recourse but to assume you are acting in bad
faith and we will feel compelled to leave and return to our duties.
Vice
Chairman Hamilton: If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to respond to the
Vice President. First, there is nothing "outside the purview" of this
Commission's mandate, including classified matters. Second, Mr. Vice President,
we agreed to this odd arrangement of having the two of you appear together as a
courtesy to you. You both are here, and we expect courtesy and cooperation from
you. If you do not like the questions posed to you, you are free to record your
objections on the record, but you have agreed to come here and tell the truth,
which implies answering the questions posed. Should you choose not to cooperate
and to leave the hearings after only about 15 minutes or so, the American people
will have to make up their own minds as to why you might have done that.
Cheney:
If you persist in turning this into an adversarial hearing, then we would like
the White House Counsel, Mr. Gonzales, to be present.
Mr. Bush Replies
Kean:
Mr. Vice President, this is not an adversarial hearing. We are an informational
body, trying to amass answers that will aid us in coming up with recommendations
to the Congress and the Executive Branch to help prevent future 9/11 attacks. In
order to do that job, we need to ask exploratory questions that help us fill in
the blanks, that give us a fuller picture of what transpired in the weeks and
months before 9/11. No disrespect is intended. In that light, The President once
again is requested to answer the question posed. We will afford you, Mr. Vice
President, the full opportunity to answer following the President's response.
Cheney:
I would appreciate the courtesy of answering first, if you don't mind. This is
all very complicated information -- and perhaps I can set the context that will
aid you in understanding the President's response.
Kean:
Mr. Vice President, we appreciate your desire to set the context for us --
and for the President. But, if memory serves, I believe Commissioner Ben
Veniste's question was asked of the President. Commissioner, would you object if
the Vice President answered the question first?
Ben
Veniste: I would be most delighted to hear the Vice President's remarks
-- following the President's response to my question.
[The President and the Vice
President confer]
Bush:
Let me say again that the intelligence information that was coming into the
White House—
Cheney:
That was coming into the FBI and CIA—
Vice
Chairman Hamilton: Mr. Cheney, I warn you again not to
int—
Kean:
Please proceed, Mr. President, without further interruptions, please.
Bush:
Yes, I was trying to say that the intelligence that we got -- the intelligence
we got from the FBI and CIA -- was all very vague, very non-specific. We knew Al
Qaida didn't like the U.S., hated us for our freedoms, you know, so the
intelligence reporting that he wanted to attack us was nothing new. And there
was nothing specific about when or where such an attack might take place, so
there was nothing I could have done, or should have done, when there were no
specific details.
Ben
Veniste: So, if I understand you correctly, Mr. President, you're
saying that if you had received exact details, you would have, in your words --
sort of -- moved heaven and earth to protect and defend American citizens and
interests.
Bush:
Yes, that's it. Exactly. I would have moved...I would have done just like you
said.
Ben
Veniste: So in the PDB of 6 August 2001, when it refers to suspicious
activities of terror suspects in several areas of the country, and in
hijackings, and their possible interest in attacks in those locations, you
didn't find that to be actionable intelligence?
Bush:
Right. No specifics. What could I have done? Made an announcement based on vague
threat information and panicked millions of people in New York and Washington?
Can you imagine what the traffic jams would have looked like as people fled
those cities? Can you imagine the federal government basically closed down
because of these vague warnings?
Examples of Possible
Actions
Ben
Veniste: Well, let's just take one for-instance, if we may. Mr.
President, when you were alerted that a "spectacular" attack was being planned
by Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaida operatives, through bombings and something
to do with hijacking airplanes, wouldn't it have made sense, given that a
catastrophic attack was on its way, to call together all the principals in your
Cabinet and get them to do everything in their power to heighten security at the
airlines, have the photos of suspected terrorists (which were released the
following day to the press) at the check-in counters, increase security around
airports, at government buildings, at large skyscrapers, alert NORAD to be on
special call, and so on? Why did you not do any of this?
Bush:
Dick Clarke was in charge of our counter-terrorism program. He alerted the FAA.
If there were any slip-ups, it wasn't my fault. The FBI and the CIA didn't
connect the d—
Ben
Veniste: My time is running out, Mr. President. So let me just try to
parse your answer and follow-up. Despite all the warnings, you, as President of
the United States, took no special measures, you ordered no special heightened
security warnings, you did not even call your principal advisers together to
seek their wisdom on what could be done to batten down the hatches and protect
the lives of American citizens. And when the 9/11 attacks did come, the fighter
jets at NORAD remained on the ground until more than an hour after the damage
was done, even though this was contrary to their quick-response protocols. So my
final question to you, Mr. President, is one that a great many Americans want to
have presented and answered openly: Did you perhaps do nothing that might have
interfered with the 9/11 attacks in order to use the fright and terror that
followed to further your own political agenda in—
Cheney:
Mr. Chairman, this is outrageous! I object strenuously to this partisan attack
on our President, our Administration. He is suggesting treasonous behavior on
our part and I will not be a party--
Kean:
Your objection is registered, Mr. Vice President. Commissioner Ben Veniste,
please rephrase your question in a less confrontational tone and permit the
President to answer it.
Cheney:
I will NOT answer it. This line of questioning, impugning my motives, cannot be
permitted to stand!
Hamilton:
That was a most intriguing reaction, Mr. Vice President. Nobody asked you about
your actions or your motives. Commissioner Ben Veniste's question was directed
at the President -- Mr. George W. Bush, the fellow sitting on your right. Are
you suggesting to us that you are the architect of the Administration's policies
with regard to pre-9/11 behavior?
Cheney:
It was a mere slip of the tongue, Mr. Vice Chairman, expressed in the heat of
the moment. I serve to aid the President in his policy decisions. He was always
in charge of Executive policy, and he is now.
Bush:
That's right. I am now. And was then. And always shall be. Just ask
Dick.
Cheney:
That's right, Mr. President. You are the man who is in charge.
Bush:
But I do count on you, Dick, for your advice and suggestions. I've always found
them most useful.
Kean: Um, this might be a good point at which to take our morning break. We still stand in recess for 20 minutes, and then we'll resume the questioning from the other Commissioners. Thank you, Mr. President; thank you, Mr. Vice President.
